Bayesian based selfish aware routing on Delay Tolerant Networks by Oliveira, Ricardo Filipe Silva et al.
Bayesian based selfish aware routing on Delay
Tolerant Networks
Ricardo Oliveira∗, Anto´nio Duarte Costa†, Maria Joa˜o Nicolau‡ and Joaquim Macedo§
Centro Algoritmi, Universidade do Minho, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal
pg17252@alunos.uminho.pt∗, costa@di.uminho.pt†, joao@dsi.uminho.pt‡, macedo@di.uminho.pt§
Abstract—Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) aim to increase
messages delivery ratio in environments where it is not possible to
establish an end-to-end connection. Although the research of new
DTN routing protocols has been gaining some relevance, those
protocols usually assume that nodes in a network will collaborate.
Nodes can behave selfishly, leading to the inappropriate use
of resources, following up the malfunction of the network
environment.
This paper presents an extension based on bayesian game
theory to existing routing protocols. Each node tries to figure
others node’s type using the Naive Bayes classifier and behaves
appropriately in order to achieve optimal results across the
cooperative nodes. The regarded data through the exchangeable
events between nodes can also be used to calculate each node’s
selfishness, assigning the acceptance and respective delivery
probability of a message to its destination. The filter extension
improved the delivery ratio of the cooperative nodes on selfish
networks.
Keywords-DTN; Selfish Routing Protocols; Selfish Aware Rout-
ing; Bayes Classifier.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the Internet’s impact on the society
has been increasing to the point of becoming an essential
need for everyone’s day-a-day. With the growing availability
of mobile devices, the costs to maintain and install faster
and broader centralized networks are also increasing [1]. On
the other hand, rural areas, developing countries, military
networks, or even in underwater or interplanetary networks
lack the network infrastructure needed to offer continuous
connectivity [2].
The connection between devices is made through the
TCP/IP protocol which heavily relies in end-to-end and low
delay connections. Those conditions are not always met.
The lack of connectivity, commonly referred as disruption,
may occur due to intermittent connectivity, long or variable
propagation delays, low data rates and high error rates [3].
The high demand and the increasing cost of network struc-
tures led to increased interest on Delay Tolerant Networks
(DTNs). These networks main goal is to offer data communi-
cation where it was not possible before, but it also improves
communication on centralized networks by diminishing the
infrastructures data load.
Originally called InterPlaNetary (IPN) Internet, DTNs
aimed to improve the interplanetary communication; however,
it was late discovered it is also adaptable to terrestrial net-
works.
Fig. 1: Representation of the store-carry-forward technique on
DTNs
As referred in multiple sources, [2], [3], DTNs consist in
overlays, known as bundle layer, which operates above any
of the communication protocols. Its mode of operation allows
nodes with different underlying protocols and technologies to
connect with each other. The bundle layer takes advantage of
ad-hoc connections between several devices exchanging mes-
sage between nodes with the store-carry-forward technique. In
this method, messages are recursively stored and forwarded on
intermediary nodes until eventually reach their destination as
illustrated in Figure 1.
DTNs are a recent case of study and offer several oppor-
tunities for research such as more efficient routing protocols,
security and fairness techniques, and data partitioning.
Several sources, [2], [3], [4], group routing protocols in
two large categories: replica based protocols, and knowledge
based protocols. The former ones make several copies of
existing messages and forwards them to reachable nodes, i.e.
flooding protocols. Those protocols are resource demanding
which may lead to several problems. On the other hand, with
the knowledge based protocols the movement of the networked
nodes is predictable or even known, hence the exchanging of
data only to the best known path. To perform the routing, those
protocols require some knowledge of the network topology.
The majority of the routing protocols consider that every
node in a network will behave as expected, but there are
always deviations from users which will try to take advantage
of the protocol and give priority on their messages. Those
nodes can have a selfish or a malicious behavior, leading to the
inappropriate use of energy, memory and network bandwidth,
which gives an unfair advantage to the rest of the nodes [5],
Fig. 2: Representation of selfish nodes on DTNs
[6], [7]. This incorrect execution of those nodes translates as a
forced drop-page of unimportant received messages for them
or the broadcast of too many messages to the rest of the nodes.
Those nodes will not relay as expected and will drastically
reduce the delivery ratio of the messages. This behavior is
exemplified in the Figure 2.
This behavior can be controlled with incentive based routing
protocols. In this paper, we propose a new extension based
on bayesian games theory for existent routing protocols. No
information is shared or considered between nodes other than
the known interactions done between them.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses the
several available routing protocols and techniques to increase
the delivery ratio on selfish network environments. Section III
describes relevant considerations used on the design of the
proposed routing protocol as well as the proposed algorithm.
Section IV discusses results and compares routing protocols.
Section V concludes the paper and discusses future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Selfish nodes can be treated as a requirement, or as a
deviation of the expected typical behavior of the routing
protocol. There are several works which consider the presence
of selfish nodes on DTNs [8], [9], [10], [11]. Nevertheless
the following techniques and routing protocols are the most
relevant for this work.
A. Coarse-Grained priority classes [5]
The goal of this technique is to minimize the effects of
resource hogs originated by greedy nodes. The used approach
only requires local information available within a DTN node.
The buffer management is structured around the concept
of domains, prioritizing domain members to use its buffer
space. A principal is a node or a set of nodes from the same
domain. All messages coming from other nodes are classified
as coming from a different domain.
If the buffer has enough free space it allocates the message,
if not, it drops the message and then rejects them in order
to free space. The technique was further expanded in order
to diminish resources consumption of greedy nodes from the
same domain. Three different methods were tested:
• The equal subdomains approach counts the number of
distinct senders, whose messages currently occupy the
buffer and then assigns a separate dynamic subdomain
for each of them with a threshold.
• The usage-biased subdomains approach assigns a thresh-
old for a given sender based on how many cumulative
buffer space it used in the past.
• The penalty box approach identifies and blocks potential
greedy node from the same domain until the buffer
becomes uncongested.
It assumes cooperative/trusted nodes can be verified and
authenticated by assigned authorities. Trusted nodes do not
change their behavior.
B. Evolutionary forwarding games [7]
Defines the nodes forwarding policies according to the
evolutionary game theory. Its main objective is to make a lower
number of players with variable strategies not as successful
as the rest of the nodes which maintain their strategy. The
decision of the strategy to use with each node is made at the
contact time. There are two modules responsible to calculate
the utility of each one of the nodes: the activation control
(AC), and the live time control (LTC).
• With the AC, during a local interaction between two
nodes, each node can have two different strategies: to
forward or not to forward its message to the destination.
The utility of the nodes which have a forwarding strategy
is calculated in conjunction with the estimation of energy
cost of each message. Nodes with no forwarding strategy
will not be considered.
• LTC prioritizes nodes which will keep the messages for
the most of their time to live value.
C. RELICS [12]
This module assigns a rank to each one of the known
nodes. It considers that every node behaves selfishly, trying to
spend as less energy as possible but maintaining an acceptable
delivery ratio. As a node relays more messages, its rank gets
higher, and consequently, its messages priority increases on
other nodes. The rank gets lower every time a node creates a
new message. All the nodes involved in the relay of a message
are rewarded.
The more messages a node wants to deliver, the more
messages it needs to relay, consequently, the more resources
it needs to spend. In order to solve this issue, each node
is allowed to set a delivery ratio threshold which is used to
activate its power saving features. A node’s radio is enabled
or disabled if its delivery ratio is higher than the threshold or
not.
D. Discussion
The assumption of trusted information and trusting authori-
ties is unrealistic under the consideration of heavily occupied
and varying scenarios. We propose a new extension which
only considers the node’s observable information about the
networks taxonomy and behaves accordingly with its made
classifications.
III. ROUTING PROTOCOL
The developed extension is based on game theory mixed
with Naive Bayes classifiers. There is a two tier classification
system. First, it classifies the scenario and then the nodes. In
this section, we start by describing what kind of information
can be considered as trustworthy, following the formulation of
the bayesian game, the classifiers algorithm, and how buffers
and connections are prioritized.
A. Trustworthy Information
Most knowledge based DTN routing protocols rely on
shared information between nodes. On selfish environments,
unless the information is given by a trustworthy node, that
information should not be considered. With this proposed ex-
tension, we assume that the privacy and integrity of a message
is assured by end-to-end encryption (by both the message’s
creator and its destination). Since neighboring nodes may only
have access to the source address and destination, they can
not modify the content of the sent messages; otherwise the
destination node can not validate the incoming message and
will discard it. This assumes nodes must share its public keys
on a previously made contact with other ones to be able to
exchange messages with them. With these considerations, it
is then possible to share some statistically events based on
the history of other nodes with both messages’ creator and
destination.
Despite these limitations, there is a considerable number
of variables and events which can effect our knowledge of
the network’s cooperation. Considered outgoing events can be
defined as:
• the number of contacts made by both Host and its
neighbor
• the transmission of a Host’s own message/ACK
• the retransmission of another node’s message/ACK
• the direct delivery of a message/ACK from the Host to
the neighbor
• the number of aborted transmissions
• the number of rejected receptions and their respective
cause (the recipient was busy, the message is old, the
message TTL (Time To Live) has expired, the recipient
has low resources, denied based on a policy, and the
recipient has no free space).
Similar data can be gathered regarding the incoming events
but, the Host needs to consider every previously events to
calculate how believable that data is.
A message and an ACK contain information about the node
for whom the message creator sent the message to and the
relay node who sent the message to the destination. The first
is immediately before the transmission of the message. The
second is in the ACK before being transmitted.
A fully cooperative node can provide information about
all its known nodes. Due to the size that this information
can reach, the number of requests made in an interval of
time must be limited. The information provided by undefined,
cooperative or fully cooperative nodes is always taken into
consideration. Information given by fully cooperative nodes
will be more valuable than the information given by coopera-
tive or undefined nodes.
B. Bayesian games formulation
Cooperation can be stimulated, and disruptive nodes can be
avoided with the application of the Game-Theory.
Game theoretic applications consider every interaction a
player can make, being necessary to specify a set of rules for
each one of the participants, as well as its outcome. There are
a wide number of Game Theory types, and it is necessary to
formulate them carefully for each case, but the common goal
is to achieve fairness according to decision-makers actions.
Those decision-makers, or players, are admittedly rational
and noncooperative, that is, players perform actions which
assure the best outcome for themselves. Those actions are
essentially dependent of the available information from other
players previous actions and its consequences. This set of
information represents a player’s strategy. The player strategies
describe actions made at each stage of the game or associate
probabilities to already known actions based on previous
actions. [7], [13], [14]
Nodes are classified according to the player’s gathered in-
formation. Non-cooperative nodes can give erratic information
about their moves; hence the concept of Bayesian games is the
most indicated for this work. Bayesian games considers the
existence of imperfect information. In this case, the imperfect
information is related to the node behavior. In order to know
if a node is cooperative or noncooperative, we must assign
it a type depending of the regarded information. This type is
given probabilistically by an additional player called Nature
(Ω). The rest of the problem is formulated as a normal game.
1) Strategies: In this Bayesian routing algorithm, rational
nodes try to maximize their rank, and therefore, maximize the
number of relayed messages across the network. In order to
do this, the host will need to choose one of the four different
strategies at every contact:
• S1: receive node Ni (Node i) message and send Host’s
message;
• S2: receive node Ni message and do not send Host’s
message;
• S3: do not receive Ni’s message and send Host’s mes-
sage;
• S4: do not receive Ni’s message and do not send Host’s
message.
2) Delivery probability and classification assignment: The
Nature (Ω) of the Hosts game with Ni is given by the
computation of the Cooperation Probability for Ni. In the very
first contact with Ni, this value is 0.5 by default, hence the
undefined classification. This value will increase and decrease
as the Host, and Ni classification is changed along the game.
Given that the proposed protocol attempts to improve ef-
ficiency in routing messages on selfish networks, it is also
necessary to take into consideration the quality of information
provided by other network nodes and the information that
each node can infer about the other. Thus, in this protocol
a node only uses the network information provided by other
nodes when they are considered fully cooperative. The delivery
probability and the node classification of the remaining nodes
are deduced with the exchange of messages. Some actions
contribute positively, whereas others have a negative effect on
both probabilities and classifications.
The information that contributes positively to the calculation
of the delivery probability is deduced by:
• The number of messages relayed or delivered;
• The number of confirmation messages relayed or deliv-
ered.
The information that negatively contributes to calculate the
delivery probability is deduced by:
• The number of aborted or denied messages;
• The number of messages sent.
However, the number of sent and rejected messages will
only effect the nodes classification if they are higher than the
threshold defined by the current scenario.
The bayesian game utility function is based on the following
formulations:
PC newi = PC oldi − (PC oldi) ∗ Piter (1)
PC newi = PC oldi + (1− PC oldi) ∗ Piter (2)
Where PC newi is the new cooperation predictability of
node Ni and PC oldi is node Ni old cooperation predictabil-
ity. Piter is a static value used to calculate new probabilities.
The lower it is, the slower it converges into the correct type,
but the more reliable it is. Ranges between 0.0 and 1.0.
C. Classifiers
As previously mentioned, the proposed algorithm uses two
different Naive Bayes classifiers, more precisely, the Update-
able Naive Bayes Classifier [15]. This specific version of
the classifier enables the continuously change/increase of the
classifiers training set, which makes the training set moldable
with varying scenarios.
The host performs an action depending on the type associ-
ated to each one of the known nodes. When a new node is
discovered, it is assigned the undefined type. This classification
is maintained for a previously defined number of outgoing and
incoming events (e.g. When the number of outgoing events or
the number of incoming events is bigger than 30). Thereafter,
a node’s classification is recalculated at every new operation
performed with a node.
A node can be classified as malicious, noncooperative,
undefined, cooperative and fully cooperative:
• Malicious nodes are statically defined as identities who
may drop, reject, or abort around 90% of the received
messages, and broadcast all of it is messages.
• Noncooperative nodes are statically defined as identities
who may drop, reject, or abort around 75% of the
received messages.
• Undefined nodes are nodes which have around 50% of
aborting messages. This could be caused by interference
on the transmission of messages.
• Cooperative nodes accept around 75% of the sent mes-
sages and generally deliver messages to the Host.
• Fully Cooperative nodes accept most of the sent mes-
sages, generally deliver messages to the Host and have
a low drop probability. Their classification is attributed
only after a long set of positive classifications.
The classifiers take into consideration every type of event
occurred in the exchange of data between nodes and consider
the number of historic classifications.
Routing protocols where each message receives a delivery
confirmation benefit for having a more assertive node’s clas-
sification, but there is a bigger exchange of messages which
decreases the buffer’s capability.
D. Extended Buffer management
The messages stored in the buffer commonly have a FIFO
order, which leads to the removal of the older messages when a
new one is received. However, in this extension, the messages
order is affected by both protocol ordering algorithm and the
owner classification.
The Epidemic, Spray and Wait [16], and Prophet [17]
routing protocols are common examples where messages are
ordered in the same order as they are received. With our
approach, messages are prioritized upwardly by a custom TTL
assigned by the function:
Cooperation Index ∗Message′s TTL. (3)
E. Extended connection list
The list of outgoing messages are commonly ordered ac-
cording to the specific routing protocol mechanics. In this
extension, the sender’s cooperation probability affects the
message’s order.
By default, messages are sent to every connection in the
same order we have made a contact. This is the case of the
Epidemic, and the Spray and Wait routing protocol. The list
of connections is sorted with our extension, giving priority to
the most cooperative routing protocols over the least.
Prophet sorts the connection list by delivery probability. Our
sorting algorithm multiplies the delivery probability with the
assigned Cooperation Index.
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
We have implemented and tested the extension on the well
known Prophet routing protocol.
To test and evaluate this technique, we have carried several
simulations with The ONE [18] simulator. The ONE is a
complete, and commonly used framework to implement and
evaluate DTN protocols. It is an open source Java solution,
easily extensive, that supports mobility, event generation and
message exchange. It includes DTN routing and application
protocols and a basic notion of energy consumption. Visualiza-
tion and analysis interfaces are also provided for importing and
exporting mobility traces, events, and even entire messages.
Fig. 3: Delivery probability in a 12 hours simulation
A. Scenario description
The proposed extension was evaluated in a scenario with
similar specifications with the default one. It has a total
number of 150 nodes (both cooperative and selfish). While
selfish nodes only accept the reception of packets created by
other selfish nodes, dismissing and dropping the reception and
forwarding from cooperative nodes, cooperative nodes send
and receive packets from any node.
The cooperative nodes use the proposed extension which
classifies the nodes and decreases the priority in receiving
and sending packets originally sent by selfish nodes. Messages
from selfish also have a lower TTL.
Both type of nodes moved randomly through the default
paths of the The ONE’s default scenario.
Each simulation was executed with 30 different seeds. For
each simulation i, there are 150 − 15i cooperative nodes
and 15i selfish nodes. The first simulation started with 150
cooperative nodes and 0 selfish nodes, whereas the last one
had 0 cooperative nodes and 150 selfish.
Each scenary simulated the interaction of nodes for 6, 12,
and 18 hours.
B. Evaluation
The delivery probability refers to the probability of a mes-
sage being delivered from a certain kind of nodes. Although
selfish nodes always maintain a higher probability of delivery
in comparison to the cooperative nodes, using the strategy
proposed, the benefit of the selfish nodes is not as evident.
However, it is apparent that the probability of delivering by
cooperative nodes (with and without strategy) decreases with
the increasing of the quantity of selfish nodes in the network.
This is because the number of nodes ready to relay cooperative
messages becomes lower.
As can be seen, when the number of selfish nodes is 0,
the probability of message delivery from this type of nodes is
approximately 40%, while when the number of selfish nodes is
about half of the total number of existing nodes in the network,
the probability delivery is also about 20%.
Since selfish nodes only receive packets from other selfish
nodes, as the number of selfish nodes increase, the number of
delivery messages tends to resemble the number of messages
delivered by the cooperative nodes when the number of selfish
nodes is 0. These results are expected because selfish nodes
treat selfish said messages in the same way that we deal with
cooperative messages from other nodes.
Node type 6 hours 12 hours 18 hours
SE 0.4 0.5 0.53
S 0.43 0.52 0.55
CE 0.18 0.22 0.25
C 0.11 0.11 0.11
TABLE I: Delivery probabilities with and without extension
filter
Table I represents the delivery probabilities of 75 Selfish,
and 75 Cooperative nodes with and without the filter exten-
sion. SE and S stand for Selfish with Extension nodes and
Selfish nodes, whereas CE and C stand for Cooperative with
Extension nodes and Cooperative nodes.
As it can be easily noticed, Cooperative nodes in presence
of Selfish nodes maintain a delivery probability of 11% as
the time goes one, because they don’t have any way to
distinguish or filter the good from the bad behaving nodes,
whereas Cooperative nodes with the Filter Extension begin
to distinguish the type nodes, and start to prioritize their
messages accordingly.
V. DISCUSSION
Cooperative nodes which used the filter extension improved
their delivery ratio, but the selfish nodes maintained their
dominance. We expect to test the proposed filter on other
routing protocols and to increase the aggressiveness of the
extension so that selfish node’s delivery ratio starts decreasing.
Furthermore, for constantly varying scenarios we plan to
propose a new classifier which classifies a scenario according
to previously similar history of events with similar delivery,
contact and proximity ratios. At the beginning of the simu-
lation, the set of scenario classifiers is empty, but, every n
minutes, the current scenario information is recorded as well
as the nodes classifications, making a new node’s training set
associated with the newly created scenario training set.
After the creation of a training set, when the next scenario
starts, it uses the previously used classifier for 5 minutes
(static defined variable), and then it finds the best match of the
scenario it’s associated node’s training set. The finding would
be made based on the information saved in the scenario’s
training phase.
APPENDIX A
NOTATION
Follows the notation and the meaning of the symbols used
through the paper.
A. Players
• Host : The node which is choosing the strategy.
• Ni: The i node contacted in the network.
B. Bayesian Game symbols
• Ω: Nature of the game.
• Npayoffij: Nis payoff for doing j strategy.
• Hpayoffj : Hosts payoff for doing j strategy.
• PC defi: Nis default cooperation predictability.
• PC newi: Nis new cooperation predictability.
• PC oldi: Nis old cooperation predictability.
• Piter: Static value used to calculate new probabilities.
The lower it is, the slower it converges into the correct
type, but the more reliable it is. Ranges between 0.0 and
1.0.
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